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Abstract 
We investigate the interface between trade and invasive species (IS) risk, focusing on the 
existing tariff escalation in agricultural and food-processing markets and its implication IS risk. 
Tariff escalation in processed agro-forestry products exacerbates the risk of IS by biasing trade 
flows towards increased trade of primary commodity flows and against processed-product trade. 
We show that reductions of tariff escalation by reduction of the tariff on processed goods 
increase allocative efficiency and reduce the IS externality, a win-win situation. We also identify 
policy menus for trade reforms involving tariffs on both raw input and processed goods leading 
to win-win situations. 
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1. Introduction 
International trade can be an important driver of environmental change, although often 
indirectly through specialization and expansion of dirty activities. In a few cases trade is the 
direct vector of the environmental issue as emphasized in recent literature. The latter has been 
focusing on accidental introductions of exotic or invasive species (IS) like pests, weeds, and 
viruses, by way of international transport of commodities, which is an important aspect of this 
complex nexus (Perrings, Williamson and Dalmazzone; Mumford). The trade and environment 
interface is inherent to the economics of IS since trade is a major vector of propagation of these 
species, although not the only one. The current economic literature is mostly focused on the 
“right” criteria to use or the optimal environmental policy response to the hazard of IS (Binder; 
Sumner). A related debate evolves around quarantine as a legitimate policy response to phyto-
sanitary risk (Anderson, McRae, and Wilson; Cook and Frazer; and Kim and Lewandrowski)  
Agricultural and forestry imports have always been an important conduit for biological 
invasions. The agricultural tariff structure, because of its strong influence on trade flows, is 
therefore an important issue to understand the hazards of IS introductions. The literature is still 
limited. Using a HOS approach, Costello and McAusland show that lowering agricultural tariffs 
could potentially lower the damage from exotic species, even though the volume of trade rises. 
An increase in imports results in a reduced domestic agricultural output. Thus the quantity of 
crops available for IS damage is reduced and so is the amount of land disturbed and thereby 
aiding the propagation of exotic species. Tu and Beghin extend this analysis to two-way trade 
and multilateral trade liberalization and trade integration, and show that the ambiguity of the 
Costello-McAusland results is much reduced in the latter context. Subsequently, McAusland and 
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regulations aimed at monitoring the risks of biological invasions linked to commodity imports, 
tariffs are found to be optimal (i.e. the optimal trade tax is positive and increasing with the risk of 
invasion), while inspections are not. Paarlberg and Lee have also investigated the role of trade 
policy as a tool for monitoring risks, linking infection risk such as Foot-and-Mouth Disease from 
imports to a tariff, so that the exporter of an infected product faces a higher tariff than would 
otherwise be the case.  
Our paper departs from this limited literature and fills an important knowledge gap in 
policy analysis related to trade and IS. We investigate the interface between trade and IS risk, 
focusing on the existing tariff escalation in agricultural and food-processing markets and its 
impact on IS hazard and associated externalities. The paper addresses and analyzes an 
overlooked but important aspect of the trade-IS debate. Tariff escalation occurs when tariffs 
increase with stages of transformation/processing of products into value-added products (e.g., 
from primary agricultural commodities to food-processing goods). Tariff escalation is well 
established in processing sectors using agro-forestry raw inputs. Tariff escalation in processed 
agro-forestry products increases the risk of IS by biasing trade flows towards primary 
commodity flows and against processed-product trade. Even though precise data on differential 
risk from agricultural to processed-good imports are limited, the risk of pest introduction appears 
much higher for non-processed commodity than for highly transformed products. Many nature-
based processed final goods are virtually IS free, whereas their raw input is a significant IS 
vector. For example, rice processing practices such as polishing, have a lethal effect on insects 
like rice weevils (Lucas and Riudavets). This suggests that the potential high risk of weevils 
invasions related to rice imports could be negligible for milled rice as compared to paddy rice 
  2imports. Similarly invasive foreign insects in raw wood products such as the Asian longhorned 
beetle can be eliminated in final goods since finish milling and kiln drying will kill most wood 
organisms when done properly. 
  We investigate the conjecture that many OECD countries could reduce or rebalance their 
trade of primary products (agricultural commodities, wood) by reducing tariffs on processed 
food and value-added wood products. The composition of their imports would change and the 
share of processed goods in imports would rise. Two welfare gains ensue. The first one is an 
allocative gain in markets. The second one refers to the reduction of IS hazard and associated 
externalities. We formalize this conjecture and establish conditions under which it arises, and 
operationalize and translate these conditions into practical policy guidance. Our specific 
objectives are to identify policy setting and reforms under which win-win situations arise 
(reduced trade distortions, reduced hazard and externalities). 
  The following sections first discuss the evidence on tariff escalation, on IS and associated 
costs. Then we analytically formalize the conditions under which win-win outcomes arise, and 
finally we provide conclusions and policy implications.  
2. Evidence on Tariff Escalation and IS 
2.1. Tariff escalation 
The economic literature has long established the existence of tariff escalation in the protection 
structure of commodity and processed product markets. Protection escalates with the level of 
processing, in almost all countries and across many products. This escalation hinders the 
exporter’s diversification into value-added and processed products. 
There is a well-established older literature on tariff escalation from the late 1970s with 
the work of Yeats, Finger, and associates (Golub and Finger; Laird and Yeats; and Yeats). Tariff 
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recent literature, (Gibson et al.; Lindland; and Rae and Josling). It continues to be so despite the 
emergence of preferential agreements in the EU and the US (Gallezot). Rae and Josling find that 
export of processed food from developing economies have been impeded by tariff escalation in 
the industrialized countries but also within themselves. These finding are based on an older 
dataset (GTAP 4). Aksoy, and Gibson et al. find similar patterns with much more recent data. 
  Telling examples of tariff escalation abound for a wide range of products. Current EU  
tariffs on milled rice imports into the EU are 80% compared to only 46% for brown rice 
(Wailes). Within the EU raw cocoa has a tariff of 0%. At its first processing stage (cocoa butter) 
it is charged 9%, and at its second stage (cocoa paste) it attracts 21%. The figures for coffee are 
4% for the raw product and 11% for its second processing stage, and for soybeans 0% and 6% 
respectively (Aksoy). Japan and the US apply comparable tariff structures. Studies show that the 
proportion of processed products to the LDCs' total agricultural produce exports dropped from 
27% to 16.9% from 1964 to 1994, while that of the developing countries as a whole during the 
same period increased from 41.7% to 54.1%. This, however, covers mostly only first-stage 
processing. If a further processing stage is taken into account, the proportions are much lower at 
8.4% and 16.6% respectively (Aksoy; Windfuhr). Wood products show similar patterns with 
logs being traded at zero or very low tariff while processed wood products faced much higher 
tariffs. 
2.2. IS and associated externalities 
The introduction of harmful exotic species into the non-native environments has received 
heightened recognition because of the threats this biological pollution poses to agriculture, 
ecosystem health, endangered species, economic interests, and even public health. In the US 
  4alone, scientists estimate that about 7,000 invasive species of plants, mammals, birds, 
amphibians, reptiles, fish, arthropods, and mollusks are established and cost the economy at least 
US$138 billion a year (Pimentel et al.). This estimate is much higher than data provided by The 
US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), which mainly focused on crop damages 
(agriculture related costs represent over 90% of the OTA estimation, and over half of Pimentel's 
calculation). For agriculture, Perrault et al. range the costs and impacts from invasive species 
into six broad categories (crop losses, rangeland value decline, water resource depletion, 
livestock disease, genetic contamination, and management and eradication costs), and estimate 
that 40% of all insect damages to crops in the US is attributable to non-indigenous species. For 
example the rice weevil (Sitophilus Oryzae) is an important crop and stored-grain destroyer that 
originated in India. It attacks wheat, corn, oats, rye, barley, sorghum, buckwheat, dried beans, 
and cashew nuts.  
  In sum large externalities are generated when IS are introduced in a new environment. 
Aggregate IS risk and externalities are conditioned by the existing trade distortion structure. The 
current trade distortions structure exacerbates this risk and costs by favoring imports with higher 
IS risk. A reduction in trade distortions will affect the IS risk level and the environmental policy 
response to address this risk, be exclusion or eradication efforts.  
3. The Model 
We use a simple multimarket partial-equilibrium model combining input and output markets in a 
small open economy distorted by tariffs and an externality induced by IS.  
3.1. Modeling tariff escalation 
Suppose that domestic final good DFG is produced from input D and I with a Cobb Douglass 
technology, where D and I are perfect substitutes raw inputs and fixed factorK . We denote 
  5DI=D+I, the total use of raw input. The production function for the domestic final good is 
1 DFG DI K
θ θ − =  with  .  () 0,1 θ ∈



























where  DI P  is the input price and  DFG P  is price of DFG.  
Turning to demand, the demand for the processed good comes from the consumer of the 
processed final products, FG. Domestic and imported processed goods, DFG and IFG, are 
assumed perfect substitutes for the consumer. For simplicity’s sake we assume quasilinear 
preferences for the processed goods. The utility of the consumer is a function of these two goods 











 where  0 γ > , and FG DFG IFG = + . 
Utility maximization subject to a budget constraint, with AOG as numeraire, leads to the 
demand for processed goods as  FG FG P
γ − =  or the inverse demand 
1/
FG PF G
γ − = . 
Suppose imported input I is subject to an ad-valorem tariff  , that is,  ,   I t (1 ) II PW P t =+ I
and imported processed good IFG is subject to an ad-valorem tariff   leading to 
. Suppose that, initially, tariff escalation is in place, i.e.,  < . By 
normalizing world prices equal to 1 without any loss of generality and using tariff factors 
denoted by τ we have 
IFG t
(1 ) IFG IFG IFG PW P t =+ I t IFG t
(1 ) II I Pt τ == + and  (1 ) IFG IFG IFG Pt τ = =+ . 
3.2. IS associated with imported input 
Suppose input D is produced with an increasing marginal cost. Suppose that the frequency of IS 
  6occurrence associated with imported input is   per unit, and imported output does not bring any 
risk. Consistent with many cases of IS, suppose the effects of  on the economy translate into an 
increase in the cost of production of the domestic input D. The total cost function is written as  
I z
I z
2 0.5 D TC FC D D α β =+ +, 
where  I zI β =  reflects the IS externality associated with imports. The marginal cost is 
D MC D α β = + . 
Profit maximizing behavior of D producer leads to marginal cost pricing behavior, which defines 
the supply of input D 
D PD α β = + . 
Since DFG and IFG are homogenous commodities, in equilibrium, they face the same price in 
domestic market:
1  
(1 ) DFG IFG FG IFG IFG IFG PP P W P tτ === +=, 
and the same for D and I: 
(1 ) D ID I I I PPPW P t I τ = == + = . 
Initial equilibrium with tariff escalation 
Denoting (*) for the equilibrium level, after some simple calculation, we get: 
* IFG FG
γ τ
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.   (4) 
Since  , and D*+I*=DI*, we solve for D* and I*: 
(1 ) * DI I PD
α τα
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− .   (6) 
Parameter   is assumed to be small enough so that  I z I z α > . This leads to a condition for both 
domestic and imported input to be positive as the following: 
** II zD I P D I α << , or   [] [] [] []
11
11 11 1 II F GI I F GI zK K
θ θ
θ θθ θτ τ α θτ τ θ − −− << − . (7) 
Total welfare of the economy include the following components: the consumer surplus 
associated with FG consumption, the surplus from the derived demand of DI captured in the 
profit equivalent to the producer surplus associated with the supply of DFG, the producer surplus 
associated with the supply of D, and the tax revenues generated by the imposition of  IFG τ  and  I τ . 
Reducing tariff escalation via a final-good tariff decrease 
We now reduce the tariff escalation by reducing the tariff (and the associated factor) on the 
processed final good,  , to  <   ( IFG t
N
IFG t IFG t
N
IFG τ  <  IFG τ ) and keeping   constant. The new 
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.   (13) 
By using  1, 0,
N
IFG IFG θ γττ <> < and comparing directly the equilibrium levels before and 
after reforms, we get the following lemma. 
Lemma 1: Under assumptions of sections 3.1 and 3.2., a reduction in tariff escalation through a 
decrease in the tariff on the imported processed good and holding the tariff on imported raw 
input constant, has the following impacts:  
(i) total final good consumed increases, domestic final good consumed decreases, and imported 
final good consumed increases;  
(ii) total raw input used decreases, domestic input used increases, and imported input used 
decreases. 
Lemma 1 is illustrated in figure 1. The policy shock is shown in figure 1a, which induces a shift 
of the derived demand DI to the left in figure 1.b, a resulting decrease in imports of the input, 
and associated externality. The latter induces a shift of the domestic supply of the input D to the 
right.  
  To compare total welfare before and after reforms, we decompose welfare in terms of 
elements in final-good and input markets.  First, welfare in the final-good market, the sum of 
  9consumer surplus, producer surplus and tariff revenue, increases as the tariff on the final good 
falls and the two triangles of deadweight loss shrink. Next in the input market, the triangle of 
deadweight loss associated with the domestic input supply D remains unchanged due to its linear 
specification and the parallel shift from the reduced externality. Note also that the changes in 
surplus from the derived demand DI and input tax revenues from I τ are captured in changes in 
profit measured in the variation of the producer surplus in the supply DFG. Hence two less 
obvious components of the welfare consequences of the lower tariff is the input producer surplus 
in D inclusive of the externality and the deadweight loss associated with the derived demand of 
DI. These two welfare components before reform are described as follows: 
* ** *
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ττ * τ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ =− = − − − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ∫∫  
where 
*
D P  is supply of D when risks are associated with equilibrium import level 
, and 














.  For this cost specification, welfare in the 
input market is: 
*
1 0.5 * * ( , ) *
I d
DI I I IFG WDz I D I d D I
τ
ττ τ τ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ =− − − ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ∫  
= ()
1/(1 ) /( 1) 1/( 1) 11
0.5 * * II I F G I I Dz I K
θ θθ θ θ
τθ τ τ τ
θθ
− −− − ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ −− − + ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
.   (14) 
These two welfare components in the input market after reforms are: 
**




DI I I WD z I D I d D I
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ττ τ τ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ =− − − ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ∫  
= ()




II I I Dz I K
θ θθ θ θ
τθ τ τ τ
θθ
− −− − ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ −− − + ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
.   (15) 
Proposition 1: Under assumptions of sections 3.1. and 3.2., a reduction in tariff escalation 
  10through a decrease in the tariff on imported processed good and holding the tariff on imported 
raw input constant, increases total welfare by increasing allocative efficiency and reducing IS 
risk and externality. 
Proof: Comparing producer surplus in DI market before and after reforms, we have   
since by lemma 1, 
** * PS PS >
** * D D >  and  ** * I I < . Comparing deadweight loss associated with 
supply of DI, since 
IFG IFG
N τ τ <  and  1 θ <  we get that 
** *
dd DI DWL DWL <
D I . We also know that 
welfare in the final-good market, which is the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and 
tariff revenue increases as the tariff on the final good falls. Therefore, total welfare, the sum of 
welfare in final-good and input market increases after reforms. The IS risk and externality 
decrease because of the reduction in imports of raw inputs I.▄ 
Some interesting situations lead to special cases of proposition 1. The results stated in 
proposition 1 hold when the tariff on imported final good is lowered to any level below its initial 
level, hence when it is equal to tariff on imported raw inputs, or when it is removed. 
Corollary 1: Under assumptions of sections 3.1.and 3.2., starting from initial tariff escalation,  
(i)  removing the tariff on the final good increases welfare and reduces IS risk. 
(ii)   a uniform tariff structure that equates tariff on processed good to tariff on raw input 
increases welfare and reduces IS risk. 
  Finally, we note the special case of a zero the tariff on the raw input in presence of tariff 
escalation. In the latter case moving to free trade in all markets is welfare improving and reduces 
the externality from IS. 
Reducing tariff escalation by joint tariff reduction 
We now consider a second policy menu reducing the escalation by reducing both tariffs or 













implies that the final-processed tariff is reduced faster than the raw-input tariff is. Figure 2 
illustrates the joint tariff reduction case with two policy shocks, i.e., both tariff factors fall. The 
processor supply DFG
s shifts moderately to the right as the input becomes cheaper., Her/his 
derived demand DI
d shifts much to the left as output price falls significantly with the reduction in 
escalation. Supply D
s shifts to the right as the externality decreases when input imports decrease. 
  This type of joint reduction menu is consistent with the spirit of tariff reforms the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) has put in place with the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(WTO [1994]). The Doha agreement is also likely to continue this approach (WTO [2004]). All 
tariffs will eventually fall but the highest tariffs fall faster than the moderate ones. This approach 
raises some issues: how fast should the tariff on the processed final good fall relative to the fall 
of the tariff on the raw input; and what supply and demand conditions would insure that such a 
reduction of escalation through joint tariff reduction would increase welfare without 
exacerbating the externality in the raw input market. 
  To derive sufficient conditions for welfare-improving joint tariff reduction, we consider 
change in deadweight loss before and after reforms and then the IS externality. There are three 
components of deadweight loss in the model: the deadweight loss associated with D supply, the 
deadweight loss associated with DI demand (or DFG supply), and the deadweight loss associated 
with FG demand. Since D and FG depend on one policy only, deadweight loss associated with 
either D or FG decreases when their respective tariff factors fall. The deadweight loss associated 
with DI (or equivalently DFG by integrability) could produce a second best situation in which a 
reduction in one tariff could exacerbate the distortion created by the other. Focusing on DI, 






≡  and measure deadweight loss, DWL, associated with DI in terms of the 
relativeτ , we have:  
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Hence, any menu that decreases both policies so that the relative τ  falls is welfare improving in 
terms of allocative efficiency, and abstracting from the eternality.
2 
3  
  The last component to worry about is the externality. The reduction in the final-good 
tariff (
NN
IFG τ < IFG τ ) works its way as in proposition 1 and reduces the externality. However, the 
reduction of the raw-input tariff (
NN
I τ < I τ ) increases raw-product imports, hence increases the IS 
risk and associated external cost β. Establishing sufficient conditions for a reduction in IS under 
joint tariff reform hinges upon having two offsetting effects on raw imports I, such that the IS 
externality is not exacerbated. There are several ways to do this. A sufficient condition is that the 
decrease in raw-input imports from the lower derived demand for DI caused by the lower    
should at least offset the increase in raw-input imports caused by the lower . This condition 
















                                                          
. Next, we formalize these sufficient conditions linking tariff 
reductions and the marginal externality so that a win-win outcome arises. Noting that 
dDI =(DI / (1-θ))( dln τIFG - dln τI )]   
 
2 A similar argument can be developed for the DWL associated with the supply DFG which is also increasing in τ.  
3 This argument holds for the single tariff reduction case considered previously too. 
  13and that  
dD = ( τI /α )dln τI ,  
we have 
dI = (DI / (1-θ))( dln τIFG - dln τI )] - ( τI /α )dln τI ,   
which leads to the condition  
(DI / (1-θ))( dln τIFG - dln τI )] - ( τI /α )dln τI  < 0,
4













>+ .   (16) 
A subset of the joint tariff reforms decreasing deadweight loss does not exacerbate the 
externality, which the relative tariff factor falls "strongly" enough. We formalize this result in the 
following proposition.  
Proposition 2. Under assumptions of sections 3.1. and 3.2., starting from an initial tariff 
escalation, reducing tariff escalation with a joint tariff reduction, increases welfare and reduces 














The intuition of the condition is straightforward. The larger the elasticity of the derived 
demand DI is with respect to the processed output price, the larger is the decrease in DI and raw 
imports I in response to a decrease of the final-good tariff factor τIFG. The smaller the raw input 
supply response is or the own-price elasticity of derived demand is in absolute value, the smaller 
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  14is the price response of import demand in absolute value, and the smaller is the export expansion 
as a result of the lower tariff factor τI . Given the assumptions we made on the supply of the raw 
input and the technology of the processed good, it is easy to show that if the final good tariff 
factor falls twice as fast as the raw-input tariff factor then the condition is satisfied.
5
3.3. Extensions  
IS associated with both imported input and imported processed good  
Suppose that the frequency of occurrence associated with imported processed good is   per 
unit, assumed negligible in the previous sections. We assume that 
IFG z
IFG I zz <  to reflect the fact that 
input is much more likely to transfer risks into a country than processed goods are. Suppose the 
effects of   and  on the economy translate into an increase in the cost of production MC I z IFG z D of 
the domestic input D as  
DD I I F G p MC D z I z IFG α == + + . 
  First, we describe the initial equilibrium with tariff escalation. Denote this equilibrium by 
a superscript ( ). The equilibrium levels of  ,  , 
e e FG
e DFG
e IFG , and   remain the same as 
those in the initial equilibrium (*) in the situation with absence of invasive species risks 
associated with imported processed good. Since  , and 
, we solve for   and 
e DI
ee
DI I I F G PD z I z I τα == + +
e F G
e ee DID I +=
e D
e I : 
1
11
e IPG II I
IFG












⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎢⎥ =− − − ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ −− − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
I τ
                                                          
, and    (17) 
 
51+ [ τI  (1-θ )/(αDI))] = 1+ (1- θ) (D
ne/DI)*1, with D
ne being the prevailing level of domestic supply D with no IS 
externality (β=0), the own-price elasticity of D
ne= 1, and D

























6   (18) 
Parameter   is assumed to be small enough such that  I z I z α > . This leads to a condition for both 
domestic and imported input to be positive as follows: 
ee
II I F G zD I z I F G D I τα <− <
e , 
where   and  *
e DI DI = *
e IFG IFG =  as specified in the previous section. The latter condition 
defines some relation between tariff factors, frequency of occurrence, and cost parameters. 
As in the previous case in section 3.2, the crux of the welfare analysis lies in the input 
market, as allocative efficiency increases unambiguously in the output market. The surplus from 
the derived demand DI can be measured in terms of the DFG producer surplus by integrability 
and can be abstracted from. Hence, welfare consequences in the input market hinge on the 
producer surplus for input D and the deadweight loss associated with the DI derived demand: 
1 0.5 ( , )
I ee e e d
DI I I IFG IFG WD z I z I F G D I d D I
τ
ττ
e τ τ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ =− −− − ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ∫  
= ()
1/(1 ) /( 1) 1/( 1) 11
0.5
ee e
II I F G I F G I I Dz I z I F G K





− ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ −− − − + ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
.   (19) 
  How does the equilibrium look after the reform? We now reduce the tariff escalation by 
reducing   to  <   and keeping   constant. Denote the new equilibrium by a superscript 
( ). The equilibrium levels of  ,  , 
IFG t
N
IFG t IFG t I t
ee ee FG
ee DFG
ee IFG , and   remain the same as those in the 
initial equilibrium (**) in the situation with absence of invasive species risks associated with 
imported processed good. 
ee DI
                                                           
6 We use 
ee
e II P G I
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ee ee ee
DI I I F G PD z I z I F τα == + + G
ee ee ee DID I + = , we solve for   and 
ee D
ee I : 
1
11
1 ee N IPG II I
IFG NN
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I τ
, and    (20) 
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11
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.   (21) 
Lemma 2: Under the assumptions of sections 3.1. and 3.3., a reduction in tariff escalation 
through a decrease in the tariff on imported final good and holding the tariff on imported raw 
input constant, has the following effects:  
(i) total final good consumption increases, domestic final good consumed decreases, and 
imported final good consumed increases;  
(ii) total raw input use decreases, imported input use decreases (increases, and therefore 
domestic input used increases (decreases)) if and only if the relative frequency of occurrence 
between risks coming with input imported and risks coming with final good imported is higher 
(lower) than the relative change in final good imported  and the total input consumed. 
Proof: These inequalities are obtained by using   and by comparing directly 
 and . 
1, 0,
N
IFG IFG tt θγ <> <
,
ee ee DI ,
ee DI
(i) , ,  ; and 
ee e FG FG >
ee e DFG DFG <
ee e IFG IFG >
(ii) , 
ee e DI DI <
ee e I I
<
>









zI F G I F G




Part (ii) of lemma 2 states a relationship between prices, demand and cost parameters and 
frequency of IS occurrence for the imported input to decrease (or increase). 
We are interested in a win-win situation which is a sufficient condition for welfare 
  17improvement since IS risk decreases with a reduction of tariff escalation.  Since a reduction in 
tariff escalation has ambiguous impacts on changes in the distribution of imported inputs and 
domestic input use, we then focus on sufficient conditions that guarantee that the externality 
from IS is not exacerbated by the reform but rather reduced.  
Welfare in input market, except the transferable DI consumer surplus, is the D producer 
surplus subtracted by the deadweight loss associated with the DI demand: 
1 0.5 ( , )
I ee ee ee ee d ee
DI I I IFG IFG WDz I z I F G D I d D I
τ
ττ τ τ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ =− −− − ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ∫  
= ()
1/(1 ) /( 1) 1/( 1) 11
0.5
IFG
ee ee ee N
II I F G I I Dz I z I F G K





− ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ −− − − + ⎣⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 (22). 
Proposition 3: Under assumptions of sections 3.1. and 3.3., reducing tariff escalation by 
reducing the tariff on the imported final good and keeping the tariff on imported raw input 
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Comparing deadweight loss associated with demand of DI, since 
IFG IFG
N τ τ <  and  1 θ <  we get that 
d
ee e
d DI DWL DWL <
D I . We also know that welfare in the final good market only, which is the sum 
  18of consumer surplus, producer surplus and tariff revenue increases as the tariff on the final good 
falls. Therefore, total welfare, which is the sum of welfare in the final-good and input markets 
increases after reforms. ▄ 
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This sufficient condition for welfare improvement is expressed locally in terms of 
underlying parameters, where (-γ) and  (θ/(1-θ)) are the own-price elasticity of demand and 
domestic supply of the final good, and sDFG is the share of the final good consumption sourced 
domestically (DFG/FG). This local condition is intuitive. As demand elasticity gets smaller in 
absolute value (lower γ), the expansion of FG and IFG induced by the lower tariff is moderated. 
As parameter θ gets larger, the decrease of the derived demand for DI induced by the lower tariff 
gets larger in absolute value, and so does the decrease in I and its IS externality. A large share 
  19sDFG means that IFG is small relative to DFG and also that DI and I are large other things being 
equal. Hence the contribution of IFG to the externality gets smaller relative to the contribution of 
I as the share sDFG gets larger. The larger initial tariff escalation (τIFG /τI  large) and the higher 
pest risk for the raw input relative to the processed final good (ZI/ZIFG large), the more likely the 
condition will be satisfied and welfare will be improved by a decrease in tariff escalation. 
Other extensions 
The argument of Costello and McAusland on ambiguous effects of unilateral trade liberalization 
could be the basis to relax the sufficient conditions underlying propositions 2 and 3. The basic 
argument is that the externality may not increase when imports increase because the higher IS 
risk is applied to a lower land base corresponding to a lower D. This argument could be applied 
in our context of tariff escalation. Sufficient conditions established in propositions 2 and 3 could 
be relaxed somewhat to account for the decrease in D induced by a lower tariff on raw inputs. 
The potentially higher β is  applied to a lower basis and may reduce the total externality if the 
decrease in D offsets the impact of higher raw imports on the externality. 
   The analysis provided in this paper would also hold with some IS-related environmental 
policies initially in place as long as the policies are not optimal, that is, a cost in the production 
of D is not internalized. Parameter zI can be policy dependent and as long as it is not equal to 
zero the cost is not fully internalized or the pest associated with imports is not fully eliminated.
7
4. Conclusions 
Our paper investigated the interface between trade and IS risk, and the impact of tariff escalation 
in agricultural and food-processing markets on IS hazard and associated externalities. Tariff 
escalation in processed agro-forestry products increases the risk of IS by biasing trade flows 
toward primary commodity flows and against processed-product trade. We show that reductions 
                                                           
7 Having zI =0 does not invalidate our results but makes them a mute point focusing exclusively on tariff escalation. 
  20of tariff escalation by reduction of the tariff on processed goods increases allocative efficiency 
and reduces the IS externality, a win-win situation. This finding has obvious implications for 
many exporters of raw and processed commodities. For example, several countries that are 
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are major exporters of 
forestry products both raw and processed. A reduction in the tariff escalation faced by forestry 
exports from ASEAN countries would produce a global win-win outcome: both economic 
efficiency and environmental sustainability would be enhanced in all countries involved. This 
implication is particularly relevant in the context of sustainable trade. Reductions in tariff 
escalation as designed in our analysis insure an expansion of value-added activities and exports 
by developing countries while mitigating environmental externalities directly associated with 
trade. 
It is well known that a first-best policy menu calls for free trade and an additional 
targeted policy instrument to address the IS externality. In absence of such an instrument or if 
such an instrument is not set optimally, we show that the tariff structure can be changed to insure 
that allocative efficiency improves while keeping the IS risk in check or even reducing it.  If the 
IS risk is contained to the raw input market, any reduction of the tariff on the final good leads to 
a desirable outcome. We also show that both tariffs can be decrease in an orderly fashion such 
that the risk of IS is not increased while deadweight loss in both markets can be reduced. Finally 
we also show that if the processed final good carries some moderate IS risk, that is smaller than 
the raw input import does, policy menus that reduce escalation and IS risk also exist but need to 
be designed to insure that the IS risk is kept in check. In the latter, win-win situations are 
characterized by a price-elastic supply of the processed good, a price-inelastic demand for the 
processed good, a predominant domestic supply of the processed good, and a high initial tariff 
  21escalation.  
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